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STATE REACTIONS TO THE TRADING OF EMISSIONS 
ALLOWANCES UNDER TITLE IV OF THE CLEAN 
AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 
Deborah M. Mostaghel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sulfur dioxide (S02) and nitrous oxide (NOx) trigger acid rain when 
they react with water vapor in the atmosphere. The reaction forms 
sulfuric acid and nitric acid, which then fall back to earth as acid rain 
or snow.1 The S02 and NOx that cause acid rain come primarily from 
the burning of fossil fuels by electric utilities.2 In the United States, 
electric utilities emit approximately sixteen million tons of S02 and 
seven million tons of NOx annually.3 Although the emissions of S02 and 
NOx come primarily from coal-burning power plants in the east and 
the midwest, the problem is not merely local. The emissions travel in 
the atmosphere, sometimes for hundreds of miles, before they fall 
back to earth as acid rain or snow.4 The Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990 (the 1990 Amendments)5 are the most recent and the strongest 
legislative attempt to secure the goal of clean air for every American.6 
Congress's finding in support of Title IV-that "the problem of acid 
deposition is of national and international significance"7-indicates 
* Instructor, The University of Toledo College of Law, J.D. The University of Utah College 
of Law 1988. 
1 Acid Rain Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,004 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R § 72). 
242 U.S.C. §§ 7651(a)(2), (a)(7) (1988). 
3 Acid Rain Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 3,590 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 72). 
4 Robert E. Cattanach, Jr. & Peter V. O'Connor, Environmental Concerns Raised By the 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 461, 473 (1992). 
5 Clean Air Act, Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7407 et seq. (1983 & Supp. V 1993). 
6 See Statement of President George Bush upon signing S. 1630, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3887-1 (1990). 
742 U.S.C. § 7651(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993). 
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both the environmental and the economic devastation wrought by 
acid rain. The Clean Air Act Amendments include eleven titles cov-
ering a wide variety of clean air provisions.s Of these provisions, one 
of the most innovative is Title IV.9 The purpose of Title IV is to reduce 
significantly the power plant emissions of acid rain precursors.10 
To cut down on the S02 emissions from coal-fired electric utilities, 
Title IV creates a two-pronged approach. First, it sets a national cap 
on emissions. Title IV allocates to each utility a number of pollution 
allowances to emit a certain amount of S02.11 The sum of all the 
allowances equals the nationwide cap. Second, Title IV recasts S02 as 
a commodity. If a utility does not need all of its allowances in a 
particular year, it may either trade them on a public exchange,12 or it 
may arrange private sales to a utility that needs more allowances to 
stay within its emissions limit.13 
The Environmental Protection Agency has delegated administra-
tion of annual auctions of emissions allowances to the Chicago Board 
of Trade.14 The Board of Trade held the first auction on March 29, 
1993/5 and the second on March 28, 1994.16 The marginal interest in 
these auctions suggests that market trading will probably not be a 
significant factor in utilities' short-term compliance with Title IV, 
8 Title I provides for attainment and maintenance of National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 
discussed infra at note 20 and accompanying text. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7403-7515 (Supp. V 1993). Title 
II governs mobile sources. [d. at §§ 7520-7590. Title III sets standards for hazardous air 
pollutants. [d. at §§ 7601-7627. Title IV deals with acid rain. [d. at §§ 7651-76510. Title V 
introduces a permit program to achieve the NAAQS. [d. at §§ 7661-766lf. Title VI regulates 
ozone-depleting substances. [d. at §§ 7671-7671q. Title VII relates to enforcement. [d. at 
§§ 7401, 7413, 7414, 7420, 7477, 7603, 7604. Title VIII and Title IX mandate air pollution studies. 
Relevant sections of Title VIII are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7612, 7492, and 7409 (1983 & 
Supp. V 1993). Title IX is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7403 and 7404 (1983 & Supp. V 1993). Title X 
directs the Environmental Protection Agency to establish a research program that will report 
on the effects of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (Supp. V 1993). Title XI establishes relief 
for businesses and individuals suffering economic hardship that results from the Clean Air Act. 
29 U.S.C. § 1662e and 29 U.S.C. § 1502 (1983 & Supp. V 1993). 
942 U.S.C. § 7551. (Supp. V 1993). 
10 For discussion of the target levels, see infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. This 
Article focuses on S02 because its volume is greater than that of NOx and because there is no 
emissions allowance system for NOx comparable to that for S02. 
11 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a) (Supp. V 1993). 
12 This is accomplished under the allocation and transfer system of 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (Supp. 
V 1993). See also id. at § 76510 (governing auction sales). 
13 A utility emitting S02 or NO. in excess of its allowances is subject to an excess emissions 
penalty. [d. at § 7651j (Supp. V 1993). 
14 EPA Reveals Air Pollution Allowance Results, COAL WEEK, Apr. 5, 1993, at 8. 
16 [d. 
16 Chicago Board of Trade Conducts Second Annual Emission Allowance Auction, Daily 
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 30, 1994). 
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perhaps because the industry has to gain familiarity with the market 
concept and with pricing strategies.17 While a few utilities are begin-
ning to trade in the market, more utilities are engaging directly in 
private buying and selling of emissions allowances. 
States have raised unforeseen objections to some of their utilities' 
private trades of emissions allowances. This Article will discuss these 
trades, the responses states have already made, and possible re-
sponses states may still make. Specifically, Section II explains why 
Title IV is built on market-based incentives and how the program 
works. Section III details the various state reactions to Title IV. 
These reactions include lawsuits and threats of legislative action to 
control utilities' emissions allowance trades. Section III also identifies 
state laws that control acid deposition, and state laws that control the 
use of state coal, to see if states use these laws to circumvent Title 
IV. Section IV analyzes the various state lawsuits and laws identified 
in Section III. Section V concludes that the most serious threat to 
utilities' ability to trade emissions freely is state legislation that would 
require state oversight of an in-state utility's trade with an out-of-
state utility. These essentially local reactions could derail the Clean 
Air Act's nationwide approach to solving the acid rain problem. Since 
the allowance program does not include NOx, the Article discusses 
only S02. 
II. TITLE IV 
A. Why The Title IV Approach? 
Clean air legislation was initially concerned with research on air 
pollution problems.18 Programs to control air pollution followed, but 
these programs generally lacked enforcement mechanisms.19 In the 
Clean Air Act of 1970,20 Congress granted some enforcement author-
ity to the infant Environmental Protection Agency,21 and Congress 
strengthened that authority when it passed the Clean Air Act 
17 [d. 
18 Air Pollution Control Research and Technical Assistance, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 360 
(1955). 
19 See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7401 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (the first Clean Air Act); Air Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 
90-148,81 Stat. 485 (1967) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
20 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (current version at 
42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
21 President Richard Nixon created the EPA by executive order in 1970. Reorganization Plan 
No.3 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2086 (1970). 
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Amendments of 1977.22 The 1977 Amendments developed national 
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), that establish the maximum 
permissible atmospheric concentrations of certain pollutants.23 The 
1977 Amendments also required individual states to develop state 
implementation plans (SIPs) to achieve these air quality standards.24 
If the ambient concentration of a pollutant exceeded the NAAQS in 
a particular geographic area, EPA designated that area a "non-attain-
ment" area for that pollutant.25 On the other hand, EPA designated 
areas where the ambient concentration registered less than the NAAQS 
as "attainment areas."26 
Over the years, the SIPs proved to be an ineffective mechanism for 
implementing and enforcing the Clean Air Act and its amendments.27 
SIPs required utilities to implement control technologies and to de-
crease S02 emissions depending on whether they were located in 
attainment or non-attainment areas.28 The SIPs gave no regard to 
how hard or how easy it would be for a particular utility to comply.29 
Some utilities found it cheaper to pay fines than to comply.30 Other 
utilities could not comply within the statutory deadlines.31 
In the 1990 Amendments, Congress focused on market-based incen-
tives to achieve the goal of reducing S02 emissions nationwide.32 Title 
IV employs a new "allocation and transfer system" for trading emis-
sions allowances33 augmenting the SIPs' traditional regulation by com-
mand and control.34 Congress expects the more flexible emissions 
22 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (current version 
at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
23 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1983 & Supp. V 1993). 
24 [d. at § 7410. 
25 [d. at § 7501(2). 
26 [d. at §§ 7407-749l. 
27 The competing interests of fostering industrial growth and attaining air quality that the 
states had to consider in their SIPs inhibited compliance and attainment. Daniel F. O'Sullivan, 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Permits and Enforcement-The Guts of the New Law, 
18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 281 (1993). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1983 & Supp. V 1993). See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.20-.2632 (1993) (describing 
each state's SIP). 
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1983 & Supp. V 1993). See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.20-.2632 (1993). 
30 Samuel Hays, Clean Air: From the 1970 Act to the 1977 Amendments, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 33, 
39,42 (1978-1979). 
31 SIPs were to attain the NAAQS within nine months after their promulgation under the 
1977 version ofthe Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a)(I) (1983). Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 101(d)(8), 
substituted "3 years (or such shorter period as the Administrator may prescribe)" for "nine 
months" throughout the section. [d. (Supp. V 1993). 
32 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a) & (b) (Supp. V 1993). 
3a [d. 
34 Preexisting Clean Air Act requirements continue in force. [d. at § 7651l (Supp. V 1993). 
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trading system, which has been called the "centerpiece of the Acid 
Rain Program," to make it easier and more practical for utilities 
nationwide to reduce total emissions of S02 within the statute's time-
table.35 
B. How Title IV Works 
Title IV provides market-based incentives. Title IV allocates a 
certain number of tradeable pollution allowances yearly to each util-
ity.36 Each allowance authorizes the utility to emit one ton of S02 
annually.37 To avoid emitting more S02 than allowed, a utility has 
several options. It may buy and burn cleaner, low-sulfur coal. It may 
install clean-coal technologies to reduce its S02 emissions. If a switch 
to low-sulfur coal or the installation of clean-coal technologies38 is not 
feasible, the utility can obtain more allowances.39 Obtaining more allow-
ances will enable the utility to maintain its level of emissions without 
incurring fines.40 
The acquisition of more allowances may be an attractive option for 
utilities that find it cost ineffective to install pollution-control equip-
ment immediately. Thus, the argument raised by environmental groups 
and others that these allowances are a "license to pollute"41 may hold 
true in the short run. Indeed, it is true that a utility that obtains more 
emissions allowances may avoid emissions reductions for a time.42 
The license-to-pollute argument, however, does not hold true in the 
long run.43 It does not hold true because limitations in existing SIPs 
35 58 Fed. Reg. 15,635 (1993). 
36 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a) (Supp. V 1993). 
371d. at § 7651a(3) (Supp. V 1993). 
38 Clean-coal technologies fall into several categories. Precombustion technologies include coal 
washing and coal liquefying or gasifying. See S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3675. Combustion technology includes fluidized bed combus-
tion, id. at 294--95, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3677-78. Postcombustion technology, the 
most commonly used technology, is called "flue gas desulfurization" or "scrubbing." ld. at 296, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3679. 
39 See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
40 42 U.S.C. § 7651j (Supp. V 1993). A utility that emits more S02 than it has allowances for 
in a given year must pay a penalty of two thousand dollars per ton of excess and must, for each 
ton of excess emitted in the given year, reduce its emissions by an additional ton in the next 
year.ld. 
41 See Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion 
of Environmental and Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV., 
565, 573 n.49 (1992) (citing PROJECT 88-RoUND 11, INCENTIVES FOR ACTION: DESIGNING 
MARKET BASED ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES 1-4 (Robert N. Stavins ed. 1991)). 
42 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651b(b), (0 (Supp. V 1993). 
43 ld. at § 7651(b). See also infra note 47. 
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remain in force.44 In addition, in order to see reductions quickly, EPA 
will implement Title IV's mandated S02 emissions reductions in two 
phases. Phase I requires that, by the year 2000, utilities must reduce 
S02 emissions to fifty percent of 1980 levels.45 Phase II requires that, 
starting January 1, 2000,46 the sum of emissions from all coal-fired 
utilities can be no more than 8.9 million tons annually. EPA will set 
new allocations of emissions allowances for each utility yearly.47 EPA 
will base these allocations on the utility's historical fuel consumption 
and on the allowable emissions rate.48 EPA will implement the fifty 
percent reduction in emissions targeted for the year 2000 during 
Phase I of the program.49 Phase I, effective January 1, 1995,50 regu-
lates the 110 utilities in the nation with the highest rates of S02 
emissions.51 Most of these utilities are located in twenty-one midwest-
ern and eastern states.52 Starting in 1995, EPA will annually allocate 
to utilities allowances for fewer tons of S02 than they emit.53 Thus, by 
the year 2000 Phase I utilities together will emit roughly fifty percent 
less S02 than they did in 1980.54 The average allowable emissions rate 
for the affected units55 in Phase I is 2.5lbs SOJmmBTU.56 
Phase II, effective January 1,2000,57 will encompass some additional 
700 power plants, comprised of approximately 2000 units, located 
throughout the contiguous forty-eight states.58 Phase II, when the 8.9 
million ton annual limit becomes effective, will lower the average 
allowable emissions rate from the 2.5 lbs/mmBTU of Phase I to 1.2 
lbs/mmBTU.59 The mandated reductions of Phase I and Phase II will 
44 [d. at § 7651l. 
45 [d. at § 7651b(a)(I). 
46 [d. 
47 [d. The number of annually allocated allowances will be less than the electric utility indus-
try's current S02 emissions, until the target cap is reached in the year 2000. S. REP. No. 228, 
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 275-82 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3658-66. 
48 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a)(I) (Supp. v 1993). 
49 [d. 
50 [d. at § 7651c. 
51 [d. 
52 [d. at § 7651c(e) tbl A. 
53 [d. at § 7651c(a)(I). 
54 [d. 
55 An affected unit is a unit subject to emission reduction requirements or limitations under 
Title IV. 42 U.S.C. § 7651a(2) (Supp. V 1993). 
56 S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 302 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3685. 
The quantity of fossil fuel consumed by an affected unit is measured in millions of British 
Thermal Units (mmBTUs). 42 U.S.C. § 7651a(4) (Supp. V 1993). 
57 [d. at § 7651d (Supp. V 1993). 
58 [d. at § 7651d(b)(I). 
59 [d. 
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result in allowable yearly emissions, in the year 2000 and after, that 
are ten million tons lower than yearly emissions during the 1980s.60 
Each year the number of allowances allocated to utilities will de-
crease until the nationwide limit is reached, and this reduction will 
have a market effect. As the number of available allowances de-
creases, their value as commodities will rise, and the cost to obtain 
excess allowances will increase. At some point, some utilities may find 
it cheaper to reduce emissions than to buy allowances. If these utili-
ties reduce emissions below their allotted allowances, they can sell 
their extra allowances to other utilities unable to make reductions.61 
Thus, Title IV lets utilities harness market forces to achieve compli-
ance with the statute's pollution-reduction goals, and it ensures, in the 
long term, that allowances are not "licenses to pollute."62 
III. UNANTICIPATED REACTIONS TO TRADING UNDER TITLE IV: 
LAWSUITS AND THREATS OF RESTRICTIVE STATE LAWS 
As utilities enter into allowance trading agreements among them-
selves, however, unanticipated state reactions raise troubling possi-
bilities. Emissions trades have spurred a lawsuit against trading and 
threats of new state laws that would restrict trades when the trade 
is perceived as allowing more pollution to drift over the very state 
from which the allowances were sold.63 In these instances the relevant 
state considered the utility's attempts to comply with Title IV to be 
detrimental to the state. Both responses-lawsuits and restrictive 
state laws-could hinder the free trading of allowances and undercut 
Title IV's effectiveness. 
60 56 Fed. Reg. 63,004. 
61 Anyone may buy emissions allowances. 42 U.S.C. § 7651O(c)(2) (Supp. V 1993). In the first 
auction, held March 29, 1993 by the Chicago Board of Trade, while utilities generally submitted 
the highest bids and won most of the allowances, bids came from many other sources, including 
brokers, public interest groups, and private investors. Utilities Buy Most SO. Allowances at 
Low Prices in First EPA Auction, INDEPENDENT POWER REP., Apr. 9, 1993, at 14. One 
successful public interest group, Ecotech International, won a single allowance for $450, the 
highest bid made. First Auction Sends Price Signal, Seen Stimulating Allowance Market, 
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK. (formerly ELECTRICAL WK.), Apr. 5, 1993, at 3. For a list of allowance 
auction results, see EPA/Chicago Board of Trade Allowance Auction Results, UTIL. ENV'T 
REP., Apr. 2, 1993, at 9. 
62 There has also been at least one quixotic pollution reduction gesture: in March, 1993, 
Northeast Utilities donated 10,000 or (seven percent) of its anticipated 150,000 emissions allow-
ances to the American Lung Association, which immediately retired them. Susan E. Kinsman, 
NU Donates Pollution Allowance, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 20, 1993 (A Edition), at Bl. 
63 The lawsuit is New York v. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 93-1214 (D.C. Cir., filed 
Mar. 12, 1993). For discussion of the proposed legislation, see infra notes 74--82 and accompany-
ing text. 
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A. New York ~ Lawsuit 
Regulators in New York state filed suit against EPA to limit trades 
that New York thinks will simply move pollution from one place to 
another. Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO), a New York utility, 
received S02 allowances under the 1990 Amendments for pollution 
control measures that it had instituted in the 1980s. LILCO sold an 
option to buy these S02 allowances to Amax Energy, Inc. (Amax), of 
Greenwich, Connecticut. Amax, an energy broker, planned to sell 
packages of allowances and coal or natural gas to utilities in the 
midwest.64 Environmental groups in New York expressed concern 
that allowances sold to midwestern utilities would result in airborne 
pollution drifting east and coming to rest in New York.65 The New 
York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) then 
filed suit against EPA,66 alleging that EPA's S02 allowance trading 
rules would allow midwestern utilities to "spew more than their share 
of emissions" and that EPA failed to establish an oversight mecha-
nism for trading allowances.67 New York wanted EPA to restrict 
trades that could result in the introduction of S02 emissions from 
outside the state into environmentally sensitive areas of New York.68 
In supporting New York's position, DEC Commissioner Thomas 
J orling stated that: 
Unless the market approach is connected to achieving reductions 
in acid deposition, the trading of allowances could result in utili-
ties in the Midwest purchasing credits and continuing to emit 
massive loadings of sulfur to the atmosphere at the expense of 
environmentally sensitive areas of New York and other north-
eastern states and Canada.69 
Jorling may have intended his statement as a scare tactic, since the 
market approach is indeed connected to achieving reductions. Utili-
ties may only sell or trade emissions allowances after the utilities have 
met the federally imposed reductions.70 LILCO had excess allowances 
64 Margaret Kriz, Emission Control, 25 NAT'L J. 1696, 1697 (1993). 
65 EPA Handling of Allowance Trading Questioned, 14 COAL & SYNFUELS TECH., No. 11, 
(Mar. 22, 1993). 
66 New York v. EPA, No. 93-1214 (D.C. Cir., filed Mar. 12, 1993). 
67 EPA Handling of Allowance Trading Questioned, supra note 65. 
68 Paul Merrion, Pollution Trading Opens In Legal, Regulatory Haze, CRAIN'S CHICAGO Bus., 
Mar. 22, 1993, at 4. 
69 EPA Handling of Allowance Trading Law Faces Double Challenge in U.S. Court, 21 
ENERGY REP., No. 11 (Mar. 22,1993). 
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (Supp. v 1993). 
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to sell because it had already implemented control measures that 
brought its emissions levels below those mandated by Title IV.71 
But because Title IV restricts emission levels starting as early as 
1995, many utilities will not be able to install clean-coal technology or 
switch fuel supply sources in time. Thus, they must acquire extra 
allowances to avoid fines for noncompliance. 
By 2000, Title IV will have reduced total S02 emissions from all 
sources by fifty percent.72 Still, one may argue for Jorling's position. 
While the flexible free-market trading scheme will result in lowered 
emissions nationwide, there is no guarantee that every area of the 
country will see equal pollution reductions. The extent to which mid-
western utilities will use technology, cleaner coal, or allowances to 
meet the statute's requirements cannot yet be predicted. When Con-
gress chose to. try the market approach to reducing S02 emissions, 
however, it rejected the inclusion of regional limitations and federal 
oversight mechanisms in Title IV.73 Thus, it is unlikely that Congress 
would be willing to change Title IV any time soon, despite New York's 
suit. 
B. The Threat of Restrictive State Laws 
1. State Legislation to Control Trades: New York and Wisconsin 
More threatening than a lawsuit to the free play of the market is 
the response to Title IV emissions allowance trades evinced by some 
state legislators who seek to control trades through restrictive state 
legislation. In response to LILCO's sale to Amax,74 New York state 
legislators introduced a bill to regulate the allowance trading of New 
York's utilities. Specifically, the bill seeks to prohibit sales or trades 
of emissions allowances to upwind utilities.75 The New York measure 
71 To settle part of New York's suit, EPA has proposed the canceling of S02 emissions credits 
for pollution cuts that New York made before Title IV was passed. Clean Air Act: EPA May 
Close "Loophole," N.Y. Enviros Pleased, American Political Network, Dec. 9, 1993, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Greenwire File. 
72 See supra notes 45--56 and accompanying text. 
73 Acid Rain Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 3,590, 3,600, 3,614-15 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R §§ 72-73, 
75,77-78). 
74 See Kriz, supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
75 New York Assemblyman Richard Brodsky introduced Assembly Bill 3569 on February 10, 
1993. The Assembly's Committee on Energy Conservation passed an amended version on March 
25, 1993 that is now under study by the New York Senate Committee on Energy. Susan 
Millington Campbell & Andrew S. Holmes, Going Once, Going Twice, Sold! EPA Auctions 
Pollution Rights; Market-Based System Permits Sale of Allowances to Emit Sulfur Dioxide, 
N.Y.L.J., 10-11 (July 7, 1993). 
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would require utilities to clear their allowance trades with the state 
"to ensure sufficient review of the potential acid deposition of such 
actions in sensitive receptor areas of the state .... "76 
Wisconsin legislators reacted similarly to a Wisconsin utility's sale 
of emissions allowances. Wisconsin Power and Light Company, based 
in Madison, sold 35,000 allowances to the Tennessee Valley Authority 
in May, 1992.77 Wisconsin Power and Light's announcement of the sale 
triggered public concern in Wisconsin about "secret trading of pollu-
tion rights."7s Five citizen action groups79 put forth the view that sales 
of allowances to utilities in so-called "dirtier" states "upwind from 
environmentally sensitive lakes and forests in Wisconsin, the N orth-
east and the Appalachian Mountains"BO were not environmentally sen-
sible.s1 At the urging of these groups, Wisconsin legislators are con-
templating the introduction of legislation to require that the terms of 
any proposed purchase or sale of S02 emission allowances be publicly 
disclosed, that the Wisconsin Public Service Commission approve 
trades before they are made, and that the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources review proposed trades for environmental im-
pacts.B2 
76 A.B. 3569, § 2, 215th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. sess. (1993) (amending the public service law 
by adding a new section 66-j, at the second paragraph). 
77 TVA to Buy Emission Creditsjrom Utility, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1992, at C2. 
78 Wisconsin Legislator Urges Bill to Prohibit 'Secret' AlllYWance Trades By Utilities, UTIL. 
ENV'T REP., Apr. 16, 1993, at 14 (hereinafter Wisconsin Legislator Urges Bill) (Statement of 
Wisconsin state representative Peter Bock (D-Milwaukee». 
79 Citizens for a Better Environment, the Citizens' Utility Board, Wisconsin's Environmental 
Decade, Sierra Club/John Muir Chapter and RENEW (Renewable Energy For Wisconsin). [d. 
so Kriz, supra note 64, at 1697. 
81 [d. 
82 Wisconsin Legislator Urges Bill, supra note 78, at 14. Public disclosure of purchase or sales 
terms would be significantly more restrictive than existing Wisconsin law. Legislation intro-
duced in Wisconsin in 1991 called for rules "consistent with but no more restrictive than the 
federal clean air act" to specify amounts of emissions. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.31(1)(r) (West 
Supp. 1993). In a phone call to the office of the bill's proponent, Representative Peter Bock, on 
February 1, 1994, legislative assistant Brad Kelly said that this legislation is still in the drafting 
stage. Wisconsin Legislator Urges Bill, supra note 78, at 14. 
Laws like this might very well withstand commerce clause challenge. Congress, pursuant to 
the commerce clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3, has ultimate authority to regulate interstate 
commerce, traditionally defined as anything in the flow of traffic between or among states. 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). State laws that regulate the flow of interstate 
commerce have withstood attack if they serve a legitimate state interest and are applied 
evenhandedly. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978). When a state law 
is attacked on commerce clause grounds for obstructing the flow of commerce, the court will 
balance the state's need to regulate against the federal government's need for uniformity in laws 
affecting interstate commerce. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). A 
common balancing standard is the three-prong test of Pike, requiring evenhanded regulation, 
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2. State Laws to Control Acid Deposition 
While no state has yet passed laws to control emissions trades 
between in-state and out-of-state utilities, several states have passed 
acid deposition controllaws.83 In their current form, these laws do not 
appear to threaten allowance trading between in- and out-of-state 
utilities. However, some of these laws regulate in-state trades.84 In 
1984, long before A.B. 3569, the bill currently under review,85 New 
York implemented a sulfur deposition control program.86 New York's 
legislative findings included the recognition that, "although the major 
sources of acid deposition precursors are located within the midwest-
ern United States and certain provinces of Canada, emissions from 
sources within the state contributed significantly to acid deposition in 
the state."87 The acid deposition control program established interim 
deposition control targets, which took effect in 1988.88 The program 
identified emissions reductions necessary to achieve the target for 
stationary sources in the state.89 To achieve a control target, even now 
in New York, a stationary source is neither required to nor prohibited 
from adopting "any particular control technique."9o 
Wisconsin has had air pollution control laws on the books at least 
since 1967.91 In implementing legislation in 1983 to provide S02 emis-
sion limitations that would be effective from 1985 to 1993, the Wiscon-
sin Legislature found that the increase in S02 emissions from station-
ary sources contributed to the acid deposition problem and threatened 
natural resources.92 The Wisconsin Legislature also found that most 
fulfillment of a legitimate local purpose, and incidental effect on interstate commerce. Id. In a 
constitutional challenge to a law like the one proposed in Wisconsin, the state would argue that 
its law regulates evenhandedly, addresses a significant state interest, and has but an incidental 
effect on interstate commerce. 
The proposed Wisconsin legislation is arguably different from the Illinois statute that a 
federal district court struck down in Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554 (N.D. 
Ill. 1993). See infra notes 173-98 and accompanying text. The Alliance court held that the Illinois 
statute violated the commerce clause because it discriminated against interstate commerce on 
its face. See 840 F.2d at 561. The Wisconsin legislation as currently proposed does not appear 
to do that. 
83 See infra notes 85-122 and accompanying text. 
84 Id. 
85 See A.B. 3569, supra note 76. 
86 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 19-0907 through 19-0911 (McKinney Supp. 1993). 
87 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW, Historical & Statutory Notes following § 19-0901. 
88 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 19-0909. 
89 Id. at § 19-0907.3. 
90 Id. at § 19-0909.2. 
91 See WIS. STAT. ANN., Historical Note following § 144.31. (West 1989). 
92 See WIS. STAT. ANN., Historical Note (2) following § 144.385 (West 1989). 
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of the S02 emissions in Wisconsin came from major utility operations.93 
In addition, it found that, "in the short term, major utility operators 
could ensure that this state's total S02 emissions [were] not excessive 
while incurring minimum or no additional costs by cooperating and 
coordinating their activities .... "94 The legislature capped the com-
bined S02 emissions of its major utilities for the years 1985 through 
1993 at 500,000 tons annually.95 Although the legislature designated 
caps for individual utilities, those caps would apply only if the total 
emissions cap for all utilities were exceeded.96 The legislature re-
quired major utilities to submit a joint annual operation plan. This 
plan must include individual annual operation plans, each utility's 
emissions limitation, and information on how the utilities would coop-
erate to comply with the total annual limitation.97 In 1985 the Wis-
consin Legislature added S02 emission rates and emission trading 
rules that would apply after 1992.98 Under these rules, any two major 
Wisconsin utilities may enter into agreements with each other for 
trading emissions, subject to Department of Natural Resources over-
sight.99 
Wisconsin's current laws encourage local government units to han-
dle air pollution problems on a local and regional basis.lOo They require 
cooperation between the Department of Natural Resources and other 
states or interstate agencies. lOl Wisconsin statutes do not yet address 
trades between a major Wisconsin utility and an out-of-state utility. 
In addition to New York and Wisconsin, several other states have 
passed acid deposition control laws.102 Among the eastern seaboard 
states, Maine implemented an acid deposition control statute in 
1985.103 The legislature found that acid deposition "poses a present and 
severe threat to the state's natural resources, including its fish and 
wildlife, agriculture and water resources, as well as to the State's 
economy and public health."!04 The legislature authorized an Acid 
Rain Impact Study to determine the contributions of in-state and 
93 [d. at Historical Note (4). 
94 [d. at Historical Note (5). 
95 [d. at Historical Note (3). 
96 [d. at Historical Note (3)(b). 
97 [d. at Historical Note (4). 
98 [d. at § 144.386. 
99 [d. at § 144.386(2)(b)(1). 
100 [d. at § 144.31(1)(c). 
101 [d. at § 144.31(2)(e). 
102 See infra notes 103-22 and accompanying text. 
103 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 603-B (West 1989). 
104 [d. at § 603-B(1). 
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out-of-state sources to the state's deposition.105 But it made no men-
tion of emissions trading. 
New Hampshire adopted similar legislation in June, 1985.106 New 
Hampshire also found that, although acid rain precursor emissions 
come primarily from the midwest,107 sources within New Hampshire 
contribute to acid deposition not only in New Hampshire but also in 
Maine and Massachusetts.108 New Hampshire's Acid Rain Deposition 
Control Program, as amended in 1990, defined "baseline emissions" as 
the total S02 emissions "in tons per calendar year averaged over the 
period 1979 through 1982 from all major sources."109 Under the pro-
gram, the Department of Environmental Services was required to 
develop a two-phase acid deposition control program. In the first 
phase, the program required a twenty-five percent S02 reduction 
from the baseline emissions by December 31, 1991.110 In the second 
phase, the goal is a fifty percent reduction by December 31, 1996.111 
The Department of Environmental Services will adopt rules to moni-
tor compliance.u2 There is no mention of trades. 
Maryland's law113 directs its departments of Natural Resources and 
Environment114 to examine the possible contribution to a reduction of 
acid deposition of "enhanced conservation activities by electric utili-
ties."115 Furthermore, these agencies must identify and analyze emis-
sions trading.u6 
Pennsylvania's acid deposition statute simply restates the require-
ments of Title IV. ll7 The statute prohibits S02 emissions greater than 
the annual number of allowances that an owner or an operator of a 
unit holds,118 forbids exceeding applicable emissions rates or stand-
ards,119 and prohibits use of an allowance before the year for which it 
has been allocated.120 
105 I d. at § 603-B(2). 
106 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-D:1 (1990 & Supp. 1993). 
I07Id. at § 125-D:l.II. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at § 125-D:2.III. 
110Id. at § 125-D:3.I. 
111 Id. at § 125-D:3.II.(b). 
112Id. 
113 MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES., § 3-3A-01-04 (1989 & Supp. 1994). 
114Id. at § 3-3A-01(e). 
115Id. at § 3-3A-01(1l). 
116 I d. at § 3-3A -04(g)(ii). 
117 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4006.5 (1993). 
118Id. at § 4006.5(e)(1). 
119 I d. at § 4006.5( e )(2). 
120 Id. at § 4006.5(e)(3). 
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Inland, Iowa has amended its environmental protection statutes to 
provide for adoption of rules consistent with the Clean Air Act's 
permitting provisions. They require an operator of an air contaminant 
source to obtain an operating permit.121 The permits for sources sub-
ject to Title IV "shall include emission allowances for S02 emission."l22 
The Iowa amendments, however, make no mention of restrictions on 
emissions trading. 
In general, states with acid deposition control laws recognize both 
locally produced and wind-borne S02 emissions as an environmental 
threat, and authorize control measures that are consistent with the 
Clean Air Act. In their present form, none of these laws appears to 
restrict emissions trading between in-state and out-of-state utilities. 
3. State Laws to Control the Use of Coal 
State laws that restrict utilities' attempts to trade emissions, even 
if they result in less wind-borne pollution landing within home-state 
borders, would threaten Title IV's ability to cut down on emissions 
nationwide. Another, quite different, type of state law could have the 
same effect: states that produce high-sulfur coal might try to restrict 
allowance trading to protect their coal industries. The achievement 
of Title IV's national pollution reduction goal might be slowed as 
utilities scramble to implement new coal-cleaning technologies while 
continuing to use high-sulfur coal. To date, though, with the exception 
of Illinois,123 states that produce high-sulfur coal have generally at-
tempted to protect their coal industries by expressing a preference 
that coal-burning utilities within the state use locally produced coaU24 
The degree to which these states control the utilities' choice of coal 
varies. 
a. States That Are Somewhat Dependent on High-Sulfur Coal 
Production 
The economies of Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and 
Tennessee all rely to some degree on the mining of high-sulfur coal. 
The Arkansas legislature protects the state's coal-mining industry 
121 1993 Iowa Legis. Servo H.F. 331 (West), amending § 455B. 133(8.a) (approved May 19, 
1993). 
122 Id. 
123 Illinois's statutes are the most protective. See infra notes 176-93 and accompanying text. 
124 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 73.1 (1989 & Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 34.080, 
§ 260.035.1(15)(b) (1990 & Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-3-811 (1989 & Supp. 1993). 
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through a requirement that at least ten percent of the coal that 
utilities burn in coal-fired plants must be mined in Arkansas.125 The 
legislature will relax the requirement if there are valid technical, 
economical, or environmental reasons.126 Further, "a utility need not 
comply if the use of ten percent Arkansas coal would result in higher 
costs to consumers than existing or alternative coal purchase arrange-
ments."127 Additionally, if a public utility's compliance with the ten 
percent rule forces the utility to exceed any applicable state or federal 
air quality emission standards, the requirement is reduced. l28 
Indiana requires state institutions to buy and use Indiana coal 
unless federal regulations require the use of low-sulfur coal.I29 Indiana 
does not require public utilities to purchase Indiana coal. It is possible 
that a public utility, to meet its requirements under the Clean Air Act, 
would propose a change of fuel type that would displace or diminish 
use of Indiana coal.I30 In such a case, the public utility must also 
analyze the economic and employment effects of the changeI3I and its 
effects on Indiana coal as a viable source of fuel. I32 To win Public 
Utility Commission approval, a public utility's plan must either pro-
vide for continued or increased use of Indiana coal or be justified by 
economic considerations.133 
Iowa gives a preference to Iowa-mined coal.l34 Further, Iowa may 
grant local coal up to a five percent preference over out-of-state coal. I35 
Missouri requires its public institutions to purchase and use coal 
that is mined in Missouri or an adjoining state, provided the cost of 
that coal is not higher than the cost of coal from other states.136 
Missouri's Environmental Improvement Authority is authorized to 
help finance the development and marketing of "[m]eans of energy 
125 ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-18-105(a)(3) (Michie 1993). 
1261d. at § 23-18-105(a). The ten percent requirement is valid "[t]o the extent that it is 
technically, economically, and environmentally feasible." ld. 
1271d. at § 23-18-105(b)(1)(A). 
128 ld. at § 23-18-105(b)(2). Specifically, "[n]o public utility shall be required to comply with 
this section [the ten percent rule] if to do so would result in the utility exceeding any of its state 
or federal air quality emissions standards or any other conditions of its environmental permits." 
ld. 
129 IND. CODE ANN. § 5-17-3-1 (West 1989). 
130 ld. at § 8-1-27-6(b)(6). 
131 ld. at § 6(b)(6)(A)(i). 
132 ld. at § 6(b)(6)(A)(ii). 
133 ld. at § 8-1-27-8(1)(D)(ii). 
134 IOWA CODE § 73.1 (1992). 
135 ld. at § 73.7. 
136 Mo. REV. STAT. § 34.080.1. (1992). 
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production utilizing energy sources other than fossil or nuclear 
fuel. ... "137 Additionally, the MEIA is authorized to help finance the 
development and marketing of "[fJossil fuels and recycled fossil fuels 
which are indigenous energy resources produced in the state of Missouri, 
including coal, heavy oil and tar sands."138 
Tennessee, like Missouri, directs state agencies and institutions to 
purchase coal mined in Tennessee if the delivered price is equal to or 
less than that of coal mined outside Tennessee.139 
While the approach of all of these states is to promote but not to 
require the use of state-mined coal, Illinois has gone further. Some of 
Illinois's coal laws express the typical preference for state-produced 
coal. Illinois requires institutions supported in whole or in part by 
public funds, or those owned by municipal corporations or political 
subdivisions, to purchase coal mined in Illinois if the cost of that coal 
does not exceed by more than ten percent the cost of coal mined in 
other states.140 Also, Illinois desires that Illinois coal use be consistent 
with environmental standards.141 Unlike these typical requirements, 
however, Illinois's Public Utilities Act of 1991142 went beyond express-
ing a preference for the use of locally produced coal. The Public 
Utilities Act actually required the installation of scrubbers on Illi-
nois's large generating units to enable the units to continue to burn 
Illinois coal.143 The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
responding to a constitutional challenge on commerce clause grounds, 
enjoined enforcement of the Public Utilities Act.144 
Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Tennessee employ preca-
tory language to aid their high-sulfur coal industries. These states' 
laws neither directly nor indirectly inhibit emissions trades. In fact, 
a percentage requirement like that of Arkansas, that a utility use ten 
percent state-produced coal unless there are valid reasons not to,145 
could encourage Arkansas utilities to buy emissions to offset contin-
ued use of in-state coal. Illinois's law, on the other hand, would have 
foreclosed Illinois utilities from trading. Units that installed scrub-
137Id. at § 260.035.1(15)(a). 
138 Id. at § (15)(b). 
139 TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-3-811 (1993). 
140 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 555/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993). 
141Id. at ch. 20, para. 3515/2(a)(1). 
142 Id. at ch. 220, para. 5/8-402.1. 
143 The Public Utilities Act affected the four largest public utility plants in Illinois. Alliance 
for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 559 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
144 See infra notes 176-98 and accompanying text. 
145 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-18-105(a) (Michie 1993). 
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bers to continue burning Illinois coal would not be in the market to 
buy emissions credits. 
b. States That Are Heavily Dependent on High-Sulfur Coal 
Production 
Since the major way for utilities to reduce S02 emissions is to cut 
down on their use of high-sulfur coal, commentators have suggested 
that Title IV may have a disproportionately heavy adverse effect on 
the high-sulfur coal mining industries in Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylva-
nia, and West Virginia, states that are leaders in coal production.l46 So 
far, industry reactions indicate awareness but not panic. For example, 
in the March 29, 1993 auction of emissions allowances, of the 150,010 
allowances sold,147 midwest utilities accounted for only a small per-
centage of sales. Kentucky Utilities Company bought 12,900 spot 
allowances and no advance allowances. PSI Energy, Inc. of Indiana 
bought 10,000 spot allowances, and Illinois Power bought 5,000 spot 
allowances. In contrast, Carolina Power and Light Company bought 
85,103 spot and advance allowances. l48 
The legislative reaction is similarly low-key. Ohio created a coal 
development office in 1985,149 which must submit to the governor an 
annual coal development agenda.150 Among other things, the agenda 
must include a "characterization of the current and potential markets 
for Ohio coal"151 and a description of projects to enhance "user markets 
for Ohio coal."152 The Ohio Legislature proposed a bill in 1991 ex-
pressly to protect Ohio rate payers and coal miners from the impact 
of Phase I of the 1990 Amendments.153 The bill would have required 
146 But see Clean All- Act Title X, Disadvantaged Business Concerns, codified at 42 u.s.c. 
§ 7601, and Title XI, Clean All- Employment Transition Assistance, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1502 
& 1662e. These titles offer relief to businesses and workers, providing funds for research, job 
searches, relocation, and education. 
147 '!\vo kinds of allowances were sold at the auction: spot and advance. "Allowances sold in 
the spot sale in any year are allowances which may only be used in that year (unless banked for 
use in a later year)." 42 U.S.C. § 76510(d)(2) (Supp. V 1993) (explanation following Tbl. 2). 
"Allowances sold in the advance auction in any year are allowances which may only be used in 
the seventh year after the year in which they are first offered for sale (unless banked for use 
in a later year)." [d. 
148 First Auction of Pollution Allowances Produces Lower Tlwn Predicted Bids, AIR WATER 
POLLUTION REP., Apr. 5, 1993, No. 14, Vol. 31. 
149 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1551.32 (Anderson 1986 & Supp. 1993). 
150 [d. at § 1551.34 (Supp. 1993). 
151 [d. at § 1551.34(B). 
152 [d. at § 1551.34(D)(3). 
153 Ohio Bill Proposes Granting Partial Preapproval ofCAA Compliance Costs, UTIL. ENV'T 
REP., May 3, 1991 (discussing H.B. 370). 
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utilities that were going to seek repayment of compliance costs in-
curred in the implementation of the 1990 Amendments to submit their 
plans to the Public Utilities Commission for prior review. The Public 
Utilities Commission would review design, cost, and the utility's ef-
forts to continue using coal mined in Ohio. The legislature has not 
passed this protectionist measure to date.l54 Ohio's boldest step is to 
encourage the use of local coal through a tax credit for electric com-
panies that use Ohio coal in coal-fired electric generating units con-
nected to flue gas desulfurization systems or to other equipment to 
handle the byproducts of coal combustion.155 
Kentucky implemented air pollution control with findings that there 
should be maintained "a reasonable degree of purity of the air re-
sources ... consistent with maximum employment and full industrial 
development."l56 Kentucky employs various strategies to make con-
tinued use of Kentucky coal competitive. Facilities that adopt fluidized 
bed combustion technology157 may apply for tax exemption.l58 Corpo-
rations receive tax credits for making additions or adjustments to 
heat-generating facilities that will enable these facilities to use coal.159 
Under Pennsylvania's public utilities statutes, the Public Utilities 
Commission will not approve contracts between a Pennsylvania pub-
lic utility and a cogeneration facility that supplies electricity for resale 
to the public if the cogeneration facility burns coal mined in a foreign 
country. 100 
West Virginia statutes are the most protective in this group of 
states. The West Virginia legislature, in passing its Public Energy 
Authority Act in 1985,161 found that reliable energy sources were 
essential to the health and economy of the United Statesl62 and that 
West Virginia has coal and other resources in abundance.l63 It further 
found that: 
164 [d. H.B. 370 was introduced May 19, 1993. The last action taken was to remove it to the 
House Committee on Finance and Appropriations on May 25, 1993. 
155 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5727.391(B) (Anderson 1991 & Supp. 1993). 
156 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.20-100 (Baldwin 1993). 
167 Coal can be "cleaned" at one of several stages: pre-combustion, combustion, or post-com-
bustion. Fluidized bed combustion technology occurs at the combustion stage. See S. REP. No. 
228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 294-95, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3677-78. 
158 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.392(9). 
169 [d. at § 141.041. 
160 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 528(B) (1994). 
161 W. VA. CODE § 5D-1-2(a). 
162 [d. 
163 [d. at § 50-1-2(b). 
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[W]ith all due regard to the protection of the environment and 
husbandry of the natural resources of this state, the health, hap-
piness, safety, right of gainful employment, and general welfare 
of the citizens of this state will be promoted by the establishment 
and operation of coal fired electric generating plants and trans-
mission facilities .... 164 
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West Virginia further requires that West Virginia electric utilities 
favor use of domestic fuel sources in deficit capacity purchase ar-
rangements.165 
Although these four states' economies are heavily dependent on 
their high-sulfur coal mining industries, their coal laws indicate pref-
erences for the continued use of in-state coal and the development of 
alternate uses for in-state coal. The laws do not currently restrict 
allowance trading between or among utilities. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Lawsuits and restrictive state laws pose various dangers to allow-
ance trading. New York's lawsuit calls for EPA to incorporate regional 
controls into emissions trades, the very restriction that Congress 
rejected in passing Title IV. Thus a suit like New York's is little more 
than an annoyance to the implementation of Title IV. Far more threat-
ening to the tradeable emissions program are the regional controls 
that states such as New York and Wisconsin are contemplating. 
There are two dangers to allowance trading in the New York and 
Wisconsin legislative approaches of implementing regional controls on 
utilities. One is that if utilities must wade through layers of regulation 
in addition to those already incorporated in Title IV, they may be 
deterred from trading at all. This would increase each utility's cost of 
complying with the mandates of Title IV. A utility that can freely 
acquire allowances can obtain excess allowances so that it can con-
tinue operations without facing costly fines while it puts in place the 
mechanisms, finding a source of clean coal or installing clean-coal 
technology, to meet the increasingly more stringent emissions re-
quirements. This approach has been characterized as a sort of "envi-
ronmental dispatching" that would integrate S02 emissions control 
into the "customary power-pooling and economic dispatching prac-
tices" already used by electric utilities to adjust volumes of electric-
ity.166 Using allowances will enable utilities to limit total emissions 
164 [d. at § 5D-1-2(e). 
165 [d. at § 24-2-1d. 
166 Joseph Goffman, Senior Attorney, Environmental Defense Fund, Testimony on Title IV of 
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while still responding to economic growth. In regions where utilities' 
overall costs are high, the sale of allowances generates revenue to 
help offset costs. In areas of burgeoning population, where the de-
mand for energy also keeps increasing, the acquisition of allowances 
enables the utility to avoid having to rely solely on high-cost clean-
coal technologies to maintain the statute's mandates.167 
The other danger inherent in the kind of state control of emissions 
trades that New York and Wisconsin are calling for is that such 
controls will impede the development of the emissions allowances 
market. A seven-state survey of the compliance plans of Phase I 
utilities suggests that these particular utilities will achieve, at a mini-
mum, 2.5 million tons more reductions than mandated by Title IV 
during the five-year period of Phase 1.168 Thus, the utilities are moti-
vated to "overcontrol,"169 since the reductions translate into tradable 
allowances that are worth money.170 However, "[i]f utilities face an 
allowance market burdened by regulations and restrictions on allow-
ance trading . . . beyond those imposed by the Clean Air Act, the 
financial justification for overcontrol will be weakened and the pros-
pect of achieving early extra reductions will be dimmed."l71 
The implementation of regional controls such as those that New 
York or Wisconsin contemplate could directly deter allowance trading 
between in-state and out-of-state utilities. It is also possible that 
states could use their acid deposition control laws to inhibit trading 
indirectly. States' acid deposition control laws could deter trading if 
they require in-state utilities to cut emissions rather than handle 
excess emissions through other means, including the purchase of ad-
ditional allowances. Even though some New York legislators would 
like to implement state control of emissions trades, New York utilities 
are currently free under New York's acid deposition laws to adopt any 
feasible control technique.172 
In Wisconsin, another state where some legislators seek state con-
trol of trading, the Department of Natural Resources oversees agree-
ments for emissions trades between Wisconsin utilities.173 Wisconsin's 
the Clean Air Act before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Subcommit-
tee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation, Oct. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, 
Cngtst File. 
1671d. at 14. 
168 Id. at 9. 
1691d. at 10. 
170ld. at 9. 
171 I d. at 10. 
172 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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current laws encourage local government units to handle air pollution 
problems on a local and regional basis.174 Wisconsin statutes do not yet 
address trades between a major Wisconsin utility and an out-of-state 
utility. 
N either Maine's, New Hampshire's, Pennsylvania's, nor Iowa's acid 
deposition control laws mention emissions trades. Maryland merely 
requires its Department of Natural Resources to analyze the effect of 
emissions trading.175 While acid deposition control laws could be used 
to restrict utilities' emissions trades, none appears to do so currently. 
Similarly, states could use their coal laws to deter emissions trades. 
No state overtly restricts allowance trading between utilities. Rather, 
states generally protect their high-sulfur coal industries through a 
statutorily expressed preference that in-state utilities burn state-
mined coal. 
Illinois's coal laws, however, went beyond the typical preference for 
use of state-mined coal. The Illinois Public Utilities Act declared that 
every generator composed of two or more units with a capacity 
greater than 500 megawatts176 must include in its Clean Air Act compli-
ance plans the installation of scrubbers177 to enable the units to con-
tinue to burn Illinois coal.178 The Alliance for Clean Coal, a group of 
low-sulfur coal interests located in western states, sued in federal 
court to enjoin enforcement of the Public Utilities Act.179 The Federal 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the injunc-
tion, finding that the Illinois Public Utilities Act violated the com-
merce clause.180 
The state argued that the coal act did not burden interstate com-
merce because it did not mandate the use of Illinois coal.181 Rather, 
the law required public utilities and the public utilities commission to 
take into account two factors: the need to use Illinois coal and the need 
to preserve the mining of coal in the state as a valuable resource.182 
The state argued that its mere requirement that the state's largest 
electric plants include the installation of scrubbers in clean air com-
pliance plans was not a requirement that scrubbers actually be in-
174 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.31(1)(c). 
175 MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 3-3A-03(a)(9)(ii) (Michie 1989). 
176 These are the four largest electric generating plants in Illinois. 
177 A pollution-control device. 
178 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 220, paras. 5/8-402.l(a)(ii), (e) (Smith-Hurd 1993). 
179 Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 556 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
180 ld. at 559. 
1811d. 
182 ld. 
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stalled; the requirement would insure that installation of scrubbers 
would be considered as an option.183 
The court rejected Illinois's position. It found that the Illinois Public 
Utilities Act impermissibly restricted the free flow of interstate com-
merce.l84 The court described two different tests to determine the 
constitutionality of a state statute.185 Under the first test, a statute 
that burdens interstate commerce "on its face" can only stand if the 
state demonstrates that the statute fulfills a legitimate local purpose 
for which there is no less-discriminatory means.186 Under the second 
test, a statute that is neutral on its face and has indirect effects on 
interstate commerce can stand if the state shows that any burdens on 
interstate commerce flowing from the statute are outweighed by the 
local benefits.187 The court found the Public Utilities Act to be dis-
criminatory on its facel88 because its requirement to consider the use 
of Illinois coal discriminated in favor of the Illinois coal industry.189 
Since the act was discriminatory on its face, it would be unconstitu-
tional unless the state could demonstrate a legitimate local purpose 
that could not be achieved through non-discriminatory means.l90 
The state attempted to justify the Act because it would preserve 
both the state's coal industry and the state's economy.191 The state also 
argued that its Act was the cheapest way for the state to comply with 
the Clean Air Act.192 
The court found this reasoning fallacious. With regard to clean air 
compliance, the court found that the state overestimated compliance 
costs because it combined actual costs of compliance, such as the cost 
of buying low-sulfur coal or the cost of building scrubbers, with what 
compliance could cost Illinois in a worst-case scenario under which its 
coal mines were closed.193 Combining actual costs with potential eco-
nomic effects was not "preservationism and environmental efficiency,"I94 
as Illinois claimed. Rather, it amounted to "naked protectionism."195 
With regard to the state's argument that the act protected the state's 
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188 Alliance for Clean Coal, 840 F. Supp. at 56l. 
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economy, the court pointed out that the protection of a state's econ-
omy has never been a legitimate local purpose.l96 Illinois's coal act thus 
did not fulfill a legitimate local purpose,197 and the court enjoined the 
Illinois Commerce Commission from enforcing it. l98 
The effect of Alliance for Clean Coal may be felt beyond Illinois. 
Under Alliance, a preference to use in-state coal that does not elevate 
use of such coal to a factor in clean air compliance plans should pass 
commerce clause review. The coal laws discussed in this Article aim 
to protect their states' coal industries. They achieve this aim without 
discriminating against interstate commerce because they have built-
in safety valves. The percentage requirements and other directives 
may go unfulfilled if there are overriding economic or environmental 
reasons. A statute such as West Virginia's statute on deficit capacity 
purchase arrangements,l99 however, which requires utilities to use or 
to favor the use of in-state coal, may fail constitutional challenges. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Threats to the private trading of emissions allowances are still 
incipient. Whether they materialize into full-fledged barriers remains 
to be seen. Presently, state acid deposition and coal laws do not seem 
to restrict utilities' ability to structure trades. Lawsuits such as New 
York's create a degree of uncertainty about the viability of emissions 
trading. However, the suit is unlikely to succeed: under the 1990 Clean 
Air Act Amendments, EPA has no authority to restrict trades be-
cause Congress rejected regional limitations on allowance trading 
when it debated and passed Title IV. 
More troubling for the future of allowance trading is the threat of 
legislation like that proposed in New York and Wisconsin. State stat-
utes that require public disclosure and state oversight before an 
in-state utility is allowed to enter into an emissions trade with an 
out-of-state utility could have serious repercussions. Such statutes 
could undermine the free-market incentives for private emissions 
trading built into Title IV. The fledgling national market for tradeable 
emissions would become a patchwork if individual states could require 
state oversight of their utilities' trades. Under the free-market ap-
proach, utilities that have traded emissions have treated the trades 
as routine business transactions, without having to open the contracts 
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underlying the trades to public scrutiny.2°O Restrictive state statutes 
would make trading cumbersome and could stifle utilities' creative 
attempts to lower their S02 emissions. Title IV's free-market ap-
proach can only work if the market is free. 
200 Kriz, supra note 64, at 1698. 
